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Though he makes no reference to it, Professor Kneller's theory of the origin of
scientific knowledge and its change in time is almost identical to that found in Adam
Smith's essay on the history of astronomy published in 1795. It is a theory based on
the concept of irreducible psychological attributes. Because of its confusion, raw
nature evokes fear in the observer and so the mind strives to bring order to this chaos,
whence scientific theories, and in turn the reduction of mental distress. The problem
with this explanation, however, is that it assumes the existence ofa mythical pre-social
man who does not have any ordered vision of nature. But all men everywhere are
socialized into a perception ofnatural order. Fear and wonder, it might be argued, are
the fruits of ordered knowledge that indicates which bits of nature are to be avoided
and which bits are to be reverenced.
Professor Kneller, however, does not devote a great deal ofspace to this theory in a
book which is in many ways the most useful and lucid review ofthe various histories
and philosophies of science available in the academic supermarket. He clearly
explains and assesses most of the major orthodox philosophies of science and
illustrates them with a wealth ofhistorical examples. These in general are well thought
out though occasionally he provokes a shudder in the reader: "Aristotle's theory of a
fixed scale ofspecies ofincreasing perfection was refuted by Darwin's theory ofevolu-
tion" (p. 130). He also deals at length with terms that are usually unexplained, such as
model and law, and thus provides a volume that should prove a valuable introductory
textbook.
But besides displaying these consumer goods the author is also a salesman and
beneath the patter of disinterested description he is anxious to sell his own brand of
science. It is not difficult to discern what this is, especially when an author usually con-
cerned to be fair dismisses peremptorily Marcuse and Habermas. Science is a rational
progressive enterprise "affected less than most pursuits by forces in the social and
cultural world in which it is done" (p. 215). Kneller's philosophical descriptions of
science turn out, as usual, to be not very helpful to the historian. Take rationality,
which "seems to consist in believing or doing things for good reasons" (p. 48). A
proposition evidenced by the counter-example of the irrationality of "British
physicists who dismissed Faraday's ideas of the electromagnetic field [and who] had
minds closed by their Newtonian training. As a result of their indifference Faraday
broke down and died early, and the advance of physics was delayed for a generation"
(p. 50). There is not much that could be further from a sensitive historical understand-
ing of men's reasons for acting the way they did. Similarly the account of the
"Sociocultural background" is couched largely in the language of "influences", an
approach which it might be suggested has not been very helpful to historians ofscience
insofar as it has led them to write two histories, the history of a science, and the
history of influencing factors. These caveats aside, however, Science as a human
endeavour is a valuable guide in a bewilderingjungle.
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